A manufacturing ransomware tabletop exercise for production continuity

Rehearse manufacturing ransomware decisions with an illustrative ERP outage scenario covering production pauses, fallback limits, communications and restart.

DigiventiLast reviewed · 6 min read
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A manufacturing ransomware response plan needs to answer more than how IT will recover servers. If ERP and shared files become unavailable, someone must decide whether production can continue, which information can be trusted, and what customers should be told while the extent of compromise remains uncertain.

A discussion-based tabletop puts those decisions under pressure without touching live equipment. Participants describe their actions, identify who would authorize them, and explain what evidence they would need. For this exercise, no one disconnects systems, changes machine settings or restores backups. The aim is to expose gaps in incident ownership and production continuity, not to demonstrate technical recovery.

The NC State cybersecurity webinar recommends rehearsing incident response and business continuity plans, letting participants try different roles rather than relying on an untested document. That is the principle behind the exercise below: make the plan usable when familiar systems and familiar people are unavailable.

Prepare the information people will need

Bring together plant leadership, operations, safety, quality, IT, cybersecurity, production planning, purchasing and customer communications. Include relevant external support through agreed participation or simulated responses. Assign a facilitator to release incident updates and a recorder to capture decisions, assumptions and unresolved questions.

Before the discussion, assemble an exercise pack that participants can access without ERP, corporate email or shared drives:

  • System status: a starting list of services marked unavailable, available or unknown. Keep availability separate from confidence that a service is uncompromised.
  • Out-of-band contacts: names, deputies and contact methods for internal decision-makers, incident responders and critical suppliers, usable outside normal company systems.
  • Production dependencies: the information needed to authorize work, identify materials, apply the correct instructions, record quality checks and release finished goods.
  • Decision authority: existing responsibilities for production pauses, emergency spending, external statements, containment and restart.
  • Fallback procedures: any approved offline instructions and recording methods, including their operating limits.

Do not silently fill gaps before the exercise. An unavailable contact or a procedure stored only on the inaccessible file server is useful evidence of a dependency that needs attention.

CyManII’s ransomware preparation guide for manufacturers warns that attackers may monitor internal communications after compromise. It recommends coordinated isolation and out-of-band communication, such as phone calls, to avoid revealing response activity. Build that constraint into the exercise rather than assuming corporate messaging remains a trusted coordination channel.

Start with an uncertain production picture

Illustrative scenario: Employees cannot open ERP or shared production files. A workstation displays a ransom demand. Some shop-floor equipment appears to be running normally, but the incident team has not established whether its supporting computers or network connections are affected. Customer orders are due for dispatch, and incoming material needs receiving.

Ask participants to state their immediate decisions using only that information. Who declares an incident? Who takes command? Who can authorize a production pause, and who acts if that person cannot be reached? Require named owners and deputies, not answers such as “management” or “IT.”

Keep technical containment decisions connected to operational consequences. Ask IT and incident responders to describe what they would seek to isolate, then ask operations and safety personnel what must be understood before any action affecting production is authorized. Record the escalation route where those responsibilities meet. Do not use the discussion to improvise live disconnection instructions.

Running equipment is not sufficient evidence for approving continued production. Ask what information is needed to establish that a particular job can proceed: approved instructions, material identity, quality requirements and a trusted way to record the work. If participants cannot establish a required condition, have the decision owner explain whether the work pauses or remains within an already approved fallback boundary.

This differs from securing legacy manufacturing equipment during normal operation. Here, the question is what the organization will authorize while compromise and operational dependencies remain uncertain.

Release updates that challenge the fallback plan

Disclose new information progressively. Let participants commit to a decision before introducing the next complication, so the discussion tests how they revise assumptions rather than how confidently they describe the written plan.

The usual contacts and procedures are unavailable

Tell the group that the primary incident contact cannot be reached and the response procedure is on the inaccessible shared drive. Ask who assumes authority, where an accessible copy should exist, and how the team records decisions outside normal systems. Capture any point where work stops because only a particular person knows what to do.

Paper records cannot be verified

Introduce a printed production schedule and handwritten stock notes whose currency has not been confirmed. A supervisor suggests continuing with them. Ask who can verify the job revision, material status and required checks. What work, if any, falls within approved offline procedures? What uncertainty requires a hold?

Do not treat “use paper” as a complete continuity plan. Have participants specify who creates and checks records, how work is identified, where records are secured, and who reconciles them before transactions are entered into recovered systems. Unverified manual records should remain an unresolved dependency, not become trustworthy through agreement in the room.

Customers and suppliers need an answer

A customer asks whether an urgent shipment will leave, while a supplier requests new delivery instructions. Ask who approves each message, which channel is used and how recipients are verified. Separate confirmed operational facts from assumptions about the incident.

Draft the messages during the exercise. Name the person responsible for the next update, and challenge any promise that depends on unverified production or recovery assumptions. The NC State webinar recommends establishing a clear communication chain and practicing employee actions in a learning environment rather than a blame-focused one.

Make recovery a decision, not an announcement

For the final update, tell participants that IT reports an ERP environment is available, but assurance about related services and shop-floor connections remains incomplete. Management wants to announce normal operations.

Ask the group to separate restoring a service, reconnecting it and authorizing production. Who approves each step? What evidence must incident responders provide about containment? What must operations, safety and quality review before affected work resumes? Who can reject or defer restart when a dependency remains unresolved?

CyManII recommends prioritizing recovery against a predefined critical-asset list that includes health-and-safety systems, revenue-generating services and their dependencies. Use that approach to challenge an automatic ERP-first recovery sequence. Ask participants to explain which business activity each recovery priority enables and what else it requires.

Define where incident response and digital forensics support enters those decisions: who requests assistance, what questions need investigation, and how findings reach the people authorized to approve reconnection. Keep technical findings and business authorization distinct.

Leave with decisions and corrective actions

Close with named decision owners and deputies, unresolved dependencies, acceptable fallback boundaries, communication responsibilities and corrective actions. Give each action an owner, a completion date and evidence required for closure. Replace “improve contacts,” for example, with a specific task to verify the alternate contact route and make it accessible outside company systems.

Rotate roles in a later rehearsal, as the NC State webinar recommends. This lets the team examine whether the process remains understandable when someone other than the usual lead must use it.

A completed tabletop shows what participants decided under the scenario’s conditions. It does not prove that backups restore, systems are clean or production can restart safely. Keep technical restore testing as a separate activity that actually exercises recovery procedures and checks the resulting systems and data.

If the discussion exposes unclear authority across plant leadership and IT, cybersecurity governance and readiness support can be a useful next step. The practical goal is a response structure people can use under uncertainty, with clear limits on what they may authorize.

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